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INTRODUCTION 
 On October 19, 2015, Chelsea Patricia Ake-Salvacion, an employee at a 
Las Vegas health spa, entered one of its cryotherapy chambers after hours for a 
treatment. She was found dead the next morning as a frozen block of ice.1 The 
cryotherapy chamber, touted for the benefits it provides in rejuvenating and 
healing the body, was not, and is still not, regulated by the United States Food 
& Drug Administration (“FDA”).2 This tragedy is not unique. Other dangerous 
medical devices are slipping past regulations straight to the consumer market 
because the FDA lacks sufficient resources to monitor new innovations and 
keep pace with technology.3 
From its earliest days, the FDA has been charged with a two-fold task—
protect the public by regulating the food and drugs it consumes and the devices 
it uses, while at the same time fostering innovation and ensuring valuable med-
ical products reach those who would benefit from them.4 Protecting the public 
is necessary because the public is vulnerable to the manufacturers of medical 
products. Fostering innovation allows manufacturers to take advantage of the 
ever-expanding technology and create safe, well-regulated medical products for 
everyone. 
                                                        
1  Woman’s Death Raises Cryotherapy Safety Concerns, CBS NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015, 1:50 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/womans-death-raises-cryotherapy-safety-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/62LN-CN4X]. 
2  Whole Body Cryotherapy (WBC): A “Cool” Trend that’s Lacks Evidence, Poses Risks, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 5, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerup 
dates/ucm508739.htm [https://perma.cc/39QE-G8SG]. Only a consumer update was given, 
not a full review of the product to determine whether it was sufficiently safe or effective to 
be used by the public. 
3  See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of 
Medical Device “Parallel Claims,” 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159, 204 (2013); Neil M. 
Issar, Preemption of State Law Claims Involving Medical Devices: Why Increasing Liability 
for Manufacturers Is a Perilous but Pivotal Proposition, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1085, 
1113 (2015). 
4  See JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
§ 12:28 (4th ed. 2017); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to 
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901–02 (2008); cf. 
Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and 
Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 883, 903 (1996). 
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The public faces two main vulnerabilities from medical product manufac-
turers. The first vulnerability arises from the desperation of the sick to be 
healthy.5 When a product is touted as “breakthrough” medicine, those who have 
been told that conventional medicine cannot heal them are given hope, some-
times falsely so. In this same vein, much of the public is desperate to be physi-
cally fit or desirable.6 While this may seem like a modern trend, the allure dates 
back to the earliest days of the FDA, with products focused on weight loss 
emerging as early as the late 1800s.7 
The second form of vulnerability is known as “information asymmetry,” 
where the seller of a product has more information about its product than the 
public.8 As medical devices have become more complex, the level of infor-
mation asymmetry continues to grow.9 A manufacturer knows virtually every-
thing about the mechanics of its device, while the public knows less—
sometimes significantly less. 
 Unfortunately, as the manufacturers innovate and create new products, the 
FDA is only able to react when a new product comes on the market. A review 
of the FDA legislative history clearly shows the cycle of high profile catastro-
phes followed by legislation—a continuous cycle of the FDA playing “catch 
up” with innovation.10 The legislative history is marked more with reaction to 
tragedy than of comprehensive foresight.11 Technology has consistently out-
paced legislation, even dating back to the early 20th century, leaving some 
drugs and devices outside of the purview of the FDA.12 Further frustrating the 
FDA’s purpose, manufacturers have continued to evade regulation by finding 
                                                        
5  O’REILLY & TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:9. 
6  Katharine A. Van Tassel, Slaying the Hydra: The History of Quack Medicine, the Obesity 
Epidemic and the FDA’s Battle to Regulate Dietary Supplements Marketed as Weight Loss 
Aids, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2009). 
7  Frank Whittemore, The History of Diet Pills, LIVESTRONG.COM (July 18, 2017), 
http://www.livestrong.com/article/74336-history-diet-pills/ [https://perma.cc/D88E-DA4Q]; 
see also Denise Grady, History Counsels Caution on Diet Pills, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/25/health/history-counsels-caution-on-diet-pills.html 
[https://perma.cc/CDU9-FY2X]. 
8  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 46 (5th ed. 2008) (When sellers 
know more about a product than do buyers, or vice versa, information is said to be distribut-
ed asymmetrically in the market. Under some circumstances, these asymmetries can be cor-
rected by the mechanism of voluntary exchange, for example, by the seller’s willingness to 
provide a warranty to guarantee the quality of a product. But severe asymmetries can disrupt 
markets so much that a social optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange. When 
that happens, government intervention in the market can ideally correct for the informational 
asymmetries and induce more nearly optimal exchange). 
9  The tongue depressor has very little, if any, information asymmetry—a patient can ascer-
tain all of the relevant information about the product. 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230 (2017). On the 
other hand, the public has a nearly impossible task in assessing the safety and efficacy of a 
pace maker, for example. 
10  See infra Part II, Sections B–E. 
11  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:28. 
12  Id. 
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loopholes in ambiguously drafted legislation regarding what constitutes a 
“medical device.”13 
 Furthermore, past FDA legislation has placed too high a burden on the 
FDA in regulating medical products and has failed to account for the limitation 
of resources at the agency’s disposal. In its earliest incarnation, the FDA had 
the almost impossible burden of proving the danger of a product.14 And in more 
recent years, the reporting requirements for manufacturers of medical devices 
were so burdensome that the FDA had neither the ability nor the resources to 
adequately process them.15 The result has been inconsistent regulation of poten-
tially harmful products. 
Each piece of legislation enacted to improve food and drug safety over the 
last one hundred years has consistently taken a myopic view of the agency’s 
duty to the public. Each amendment has chosen to focus on either protecting 
the public by expanding the scope of FDA regulation,16 thereby increasing the 
burden on manufacturers to bring products to market, or on fostering innova-
tion and the public’s access to drugs and devices,17 thereby reducing the burden 
on manufacturers without accounting for impact on safety to the public. Addi-
tionally, at each stage, the resource limitations of the FDA have been ignored.18 
At no point has a comprehensive approach been taken, where both the vulnera-
ble public and the burden on manufacturers has been the focus, while at the 
same time attempting to reduce the burden on the FDA by utilizing other tools 
at the legislature’s disposal. 
This article highlights problems with the current medical device regulatory 
scheme and offers solutions that both reduce the impact on the FDA’s resources 
and allow for tort law to balance the scales between manufacturer and public. 
Part II of this article will explore the last century of the FDA and its evolution 
through the tragedies it has witnessed. It will show how the FDA has oscillated 
between excessive regulations and failing to adequately regulate drugs and de-
vices. It will also discuss the various Acts that have shaped the agency through 
today, from the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (“PFDA”), which formed the 
initial incarnation of the FDA, through the Food and Drug Administration 
                                                        
13  See Susan Bartlett Foote, The Impact of Public Policy on Medical Device Innovation: A 
Case of Polyintervention, in 2 MEDICAL INNOVATION AT THE CROSSROADS, THE CHANGING 
ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 69, 76 (Annetine C. Gelijns & Ethan A. Halm eds., 
1991). 
14  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4. 
15  U.S. GOV’T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/HEHS-97-21, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S SYSTEM FOR MONITORING PROBLEMS WITH APPROVED 
DEVICES 2–3, 5, 9, 11 (1997). 
16  See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 101, 107, 76 Stat. 780, 780–81, 
788–89 (1962); Deborah G. Parver, Expediting the Drug Approval Process: An Analysis of 
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 (1999). 
17  See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016); see also U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 2014–2018 (2014). 
18  Noah, supra note 4, at 902. 
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Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”), which attempted—but failed—to 
give the public quicker access to medical devices.19 
 Part III of this article begins by explaining relevant portions of the newly 
enacted 21st Century Cures Act (“21CCA”) that pertain to regulation of medi-
cal devices. This Part will discuss how the new legislation failed to heed the 
mistakes of past Acts governing the FDA. While in spirit the Act purports to 
grant patients faster access to new medical products, it ignores the limitations 
of the FDA and disregards the role the public could play in achieving its ulti-
mate goal. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article will explain how utilizing economic forces 
is critical in crafting legislation to effectively regulate medical devices. This 
Part will examine potential revisions to the 21CCA that could accomplish the 
goal of getting products to market that genuinely help the public, while putting 
checks in place to restrict harmful products from reaching the public. I propose 
using a combination of deregulation, tort law, and federal preemption power as 
tools to achieve this goal. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FDA REVEALS FAILURE TO KEEP UP WITH 
TECHNOLOGY 
A. Public Outcry over Harrowing Conditions in Meatpacking Facilities 
Prompts the Enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
There would be meat that had tumbled out on the floor, in the dirt and sawdust, 
where the workers had tramped and spit uncounted billions of consumption 
germs. There would be meat stored in great piles in rooms; and the water from 
leaky roofs would drip over it, and thousands of rats would race about on 
it. . . . This is no fairy story and no joke; the meat would be shovelled into carts, 
and the man who did the shovelling would not trouble to lift out a rat even 
when he saw one—there were things that went into the sausage in comparison 
with which a poisoned rat was a tidbit.20 
In 1906, President Roosevelt signed into law the first piece of legislation 
that aimed at protecting the public from certain foods and drugs.21 Although 
nearly one hundred bills had been introduced to Congress up to that point, it 
was not until public outcry over the nauseating conditions in the meatpacking 
industry were exposed that a law was enacted to protect the public.22 It was in 
                                                        
19  Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2296 (1997); Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938). 
20  UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 161–62 (1906). 
21  FDA’s Origins & Functions Part I: The 1906 Food and Drug Act and Its Enforcement, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/origin/ucm054 
819.htm [https://perma.cc/7GE2-RBM2] (last updated Feb. 1, 2018). 
22  Id. 
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1906 that Upton Sinclair published The Jungle, which highlighted the plight of 
immigrant workers in industrialized cities.23 The book had an unintended effect 
in that it also portrayed the unsanitary conditions of meatpacking facilities. The 
public was outraged by this exposé of the meatpacking industry,24 resulting in a 
public movement to reform the food industry and, ultimately, in the passage of 
the PFDA of 1906.25 The PFDA created an agency within the Department of 
Agriculture called the Bureau of Chemistry, which was tasked with preventing 
and prosecuting the manufacture of food or drugs that were “adulterated or 
misbranded.”26 This legislation did not require manufacturers to prove that food 
and drugs were safe or effective, only that the food and drugs were not adulter-
ated or misbranded.27 As discussed below, the Bureau of Chemistry was the 
agency that would eventually be renamed the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”). For continuity in this article, the agency will be referred to as “the 
FDA,” even when describing its previous incarnations. 
 The FDA was largely ineffective in its early attempts to protect the public 
from unsafe products. The PFDA placed the burden of proof about a product’s 
claims not on the manufacturer, but on the FDA.28 The lack of data for adverse 
events and insufficient scientific evidence of a product’s effects on people led 
to a string of losses for the FDA in prosecuting manufacturers for harmful 
products.29 The result was that unsafe or misleading products continued to be 
freely sold in the market while dishonest manufacturers profited off of the unin-
formed public.30 The poorly-drafted PFDA evidenced a failure by Congress to 
understand the nature of technology, especially the speed at which it advances. 
The PFDA was focused only on preventing food or drugs from being adulterat-
ed or misbranded.31 Drugs deemed adulterated are those sold under a recog-
                                                        
23  See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 20. 
24  Shauna Manion, A Science-Based Endeavor: Interpreting Contamination Prevention in 
The Food Safety Modernization Act, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 537, 540–41 (2012). 
25  Baylen J. Linnekin & Emily M. Broad Leib, Food Law & Policy: The Fertile Field’s Ori-
gins and First Decade, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 557, 562 (2014); see also The Pure Food and 
Drug Act, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house 
.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032393280 [https://perma.cc/GBM3-RTJ7] (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2017). 
26  Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 4, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938), amended by Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 126(B), 111 Stat. 2296 
(1997); Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to 
Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 300 (2001). 
27  Shuren, supra note 26. 
28  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:4. At this time in its history, the FDA reg-
ulated only false labeling, and not safety and efficacy of drugs; see Sue McGrath, Note, Only 
a Matter of Time: Lessons Unlearned at the Food and Drug Administration Keep Americans 
at Risk, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 603, 604 (2005). 
29  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:4; see also Seven Cases v. United States, 
239 U.S. 510, 511 (1916); United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 495 (1911). 
30  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:6. 
31  Shuren, supra note 26. 
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nized name but differ from the standards of strength, quality or purity as set 
forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary or those which 
fall below the professed standard or quality under which it is sold.32 As for 
food, there are many ways in which they may become adulterated.33 These in-
clude but are not limited to foods in which a substance is mixed or packed with 
it which reduces or lowers its quality or strength; the food is altered to conceal 
damage or inferiority; or if the foods contain any added poisonous or other del-
eterious ingredients which may render the food harmful to one’s health.34 A 
food or drug becomes misbranded when the package or label bears any state-
ment, design, or device which is either false or misleading in any way.35 Unfor-
tunately, the legislation did not account for the fact that new technology would 
have a dramatic impact on the way food and drugs were processed. 
 One such technological advancement that outpaced the PFDA was food 
processing.36 The fast freezing machine was invented in 1924, and by the 1930s 
packaged food had begun a revolution.37 The problem for consumers was that 
they had no means of knowing exactly what was in packaged foods.38 Addi-
tionally, a proviso in the PFDA carved out an exception for products marketed 
under a “distinctive name,” meaning they could not be prosecuted as adulterat-
ed or misbranded.39 One example was “BRED-SPRED,” a purported strawber-
ry jelly that contained no strawberries, but did contain “highly carcinogenic 
coal tar, several chemical preservatives, artificial chemical pectin, artificial 
chemical flavorings, and grass seeds to add a touch of realism.”40 Though under 
the Act it would have been deemed both adulterated and misbranded, due to the 
carve-out, BRED-SPRED was unregulated, as were a plethora of other prod-
ucts, such as milk being watered down and preserved with formaldehyde.41 The 
result was a public unable to make informed decisions due to the lack of infor-
mation and agency oversight.42 
This same harm befell the public when it came to drugs. There was no re-
quirement in place to require that medical products on the market be either safe 
                                                        
32  Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938). 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. § 8. 
36  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:7. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  United States v. Forty Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 191 F. 431, 434 (E.D. Tenn. 
1911), rev’d, 241 U.S. 265 (1916). 
40  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:7. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
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or effective.43 Drugs and devices touted false therapeutic claims, and the law as 
written did not protect the public from these scams.44 It would take another high 
profile catastrophe resulting in public outcry to urge Congress to pass addition-
al legislation to protect the public.45 In 1938, Congress took steps to repeal the 
PFDA and enacted new legislation with a goal to protect the vulnerable public 
from untested and potentially dangerous drugs that purported to increase an in-
dividual’s health.46 
B. The Elixir of Sulfanilamide Tragedy of 1937 Prompts Congress to Enact 
the Food and Drug Cosmetic Act of 1938 
 Although a bill to strengthen the regulations of food and drugs had been 
languishing in Congress for nearly five years, tragedy was the catalyst that fi-
nally prompted the repeal of the PFDA.47 A manufacturer that previously pro-
duced an antibiotic pill called sulfanilamide offered the product “ ‘Elixir of Sul-
fanilamide,’ ” which was a liquid version of the antibiotic meant to treat 
bacterial infections in children.48 To create the solution, the manufacturer com-
bined the antibiotic with diethylene glycol—known today as a major compo-
nent in antifreeze.49 The result was the deaths of over 100 people, the majority 
of them children.50 Additionally, the chemist who created the solution commit-
ted suicide after the incident.51 Even worse, this tragedy was avoidable; proper 
vetting of the drug would have stopped its production before ever reaching the 
market.52 
 The result of the “Elixir of Sulfanilamide” tragedy was the passage of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).53 Initially intro-
duced in 1933, but not passed until after the “Elixir” incident, the FDCA re-
                                                        
43  Sheryl Lawrence, What Would You Do with a Fluorescent Green Pig?: How Novel 
Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 215 (2007). 
44  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:4; see generally United States v. Johnson, 
221 U.S. 488 (1911) (where a drug label improperly implied the contents were effective in 
curing cancer). 
45  Noah, supra note 4, at 901 (discussing the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy); Van Tassel, su-
pra note 6, at 223–24. 
46  Lawrence, supra note 43, at 215. 
47  McGrath, supra note 28 at 604. 
48  Karen Baswell, Note, Time for a Change: Why the FDA Should Require Greater Disclo-
sure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Efficacy of Approved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1799, 1809 (2007). 
49  McGrath, supra note 28 at 604. 
50  Nancy E. Pirt, Regulation of the Export of Pharmaceuticals to Developing Countries, 25 
DUQ. L. REV. 255, 259 (1987). 
51  Id. 
52  “What the chemist who invented the elixir did not know, although others did, was that 
diethylene glycol, when ingested, would convert into deadly oxalic acid, a poison that de-
stroys the kidneys.” Id. 
53  Baswell, supra note 48, at 1809. 
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quired a drug to be safe based on its intended use per the labeling.54 Additional-
ly, a seminal feature of the FDCA was that it expanded the FDA’s scope to in-
clude medical devices.55 
Until 1938, the FDA had no jurisdiction over medical devices. But by that 
time, Congress had become concerned with the rise in fraudulent medical de-
vices being marketed.56 The FDCA granted the FDA the authority to regulate 
post-market devices for misbranding and adulteration, but stopped short of giv-
ing the FDA pre-market review.57 However, it did grant pre-market safety re-
view of drugs, maintaining the disparity in FDA oversight between devices and 
drugs.58 The FDCA also established a tenet of the FDA’s purpose: that regula-
tion should match “the level of vulnerability of the product’s targeted popula-
tion.”59 The FDCA of 1938 is still in effect today, but it has been amended 
many times since its inception. 
C. Thalidomide Tragedy Prompts the Enactment of The Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments of 1962 
 The first major amendment to the FDCA came in 1962 after yet another 
tragedy involving a manufactured drug.60 A sleeping pill called thalidomide 
was being marketed over the counter as “completely safe” for everyone from 
mothers to children. The drug was widely used by consumers, and was report-
edly as prevalent as aspirin in the late 1950s.61 The drug was also recommended 
by doctors as an off-label way to treat pregnant women with morning sick-
ness.62 However, doctors began to notice that the women that had used thalid-
omide while pregnant were giving birth to babies with severe birth defects.63 
The mothers who had taken the drug during pregnancy had a high likelihood of 
                                                        
54  J. Richard Crout et al., FDA’s Role in the Pathway to Safe and Effective Drugs, in FDA: 
A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 163 (Wayne L. Pines ed., 2006); see also O’REILLY 
& VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:11. 
55  Ann Mileur Boeckman, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA’s Assertion of 
Jurisdiction over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 996–97 (1996). 
56  Kyle Lennox, Substantially Unequivalent: Reforming FDA Regulation of Medical Devic-
es, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1363, 1376–77 (2014). 
57  Id. at 1377. 
58  Id. 
59  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:8. Discussed below, this vulnerability is 
greater today than ever. 
60  Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, 
HELIX MAG. (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-
lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/S935-QTVH]. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Michael Winerip, The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/the-death-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide.html 
[https://perma.cc/8L5U-FS3S]. 
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having a child born with phocomelia, resulting in missing or deformed limbs.64 
Over ten thousand babies were reportedly born with this condition, and nearly 
50 percent of those babies did not survive.65 
The citizens of the United States did not endure this tragedy first-hand be-
cause the FDA had wisely blocked the use of thalidomide in the United 
States.66 At that point in history, a pre-market approval was required to show 
the safety of a drug.67 Data on thalidomide’s safety, especially regarding preg-
nant women, was insufficient, so FDA inspector Frances Kelsey prevented the 
drug’s approval in the United States despite pressure from the pharmaceutical 
company and FDA supervisors. Regulators had done their job to protect the 
public, but this unimaginable worldwide tragedy raised questions as to whether 
more regulations were needed to protect the public.68 Public concern grew over 
the number of other products entering the market for which manufacturers were 
not required to show efficacy.69 The result was the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments, which changed the law to require manufacturers to show “safety 
and efficacy” before marketing new drugs.70 The amendment also blurred the 
line between drug and device, with the definitions “overlapping” each other.71 
As a result of these overlapping definitions, the FDA began to regulate new de-
vices in the same way as drugs, requiring them to undergo the same pre-market 
approval process.72 However, despite a few judicial victories where a court was 
convinced that a device should be regulated the same as drugs, continuous liti-
gation proved too difficult for the FDA to continue enforcing pre-market ap-
proval on devices.73 The ambiguity in the statute, combined with the significant 
increase of medical devices in the 1960s and 1970s, made it clear that the statu-
                                                        
64  Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Eco-
nomics of Refusals to Deal with Potential Generic Competitors, 67 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1005–
06 (2015). 
65  Id. 
66  Michael I. Krauss, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly: Implications for 
Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 467 n.47 (1996). 
67  Id. at 461–62. 
68  Van Tassel, supra note 6, at 228. 
69  Jordan Bauman, The “Déjà Vu Effect:” Evaluation of United States Medical Device Leg-
islation, Regulation, and the Food and Drug Administration’s Contentious 510(k) Program, 
67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 337, 340 (2012). “Later, it was discovered that Thalidomide had al-
ready been provided to 20,000 patients in the United States as part of an ‘investigational 
study’ while Thalidomide’s application for approval was on hold.” O’REILLY & VAN 
TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:16. 
70  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4, at § 12:16. 
71  Bauman, supra note 69, at 340. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. Although the FDA was successful in convincing courts to declare some devices as 
drugs under the statute—and therefore subject to premarket review—it clearly could not 
maintain litigating those types of cases in perpetuity. See AMP, Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 
825, 829–30 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, AMP, Inc. v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 825, 825 (1968). 
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tory language was insufficient to adequately protect the public from harmful 
devices.74 
 Thus, once again, the FDA found itself chained to legislation that failed to 
account for the pace of technological innovation and failed to account for the 
limited resources available to the agency. In September 1970, Dr. Theodore 
Cooper submitted a report on a ten-year study of medical devices to the secre-
tary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.75 The study “re-
vealed over 731 deaths and 9,000 injuries from medical devices.”76 Dr. 
Cooper’s opinion was that, due to the increasing amount and complexity of 
medical devices entering the market and the variance in issues presented by de-
vices compared to drugs, the FDA should revamp its method in regulating de-
vices.77 Not unlike the FDCA of 1938, which was presented years before it was 
enacted and only passed in response to tragedy, Dr. Cooper’s report produced 
no formal legislation until 1976, when another product was linked to mass inju-
ry and death.78 
D. The Dalkon Shield Tragedy Prompts the Enactment of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 
The Dalkon Shield entered the market in 1970 as a device designed to pre-
vent pregnancy.79 When placed in the uterus, part of the Dalkon Shield was ex-
posed through the cervix to allow for easier removal.80 The composition of the 
“tail” that was exposed compromised the sterile environment of the uterus, 
leading to complications and infections.81 In 1974, after receiving reports of in-
effectiveness, infections, and even deaths, the manufacturer was forced to pull 
the device from the market.82 In the end, the manufacturer faced over three 
hundred thousand complaints over the Dalkon Shield.83 
 In addition, a report was issued that pointed to ten thousand device-related 
injuries and 751 deaths from 1960 to 1970.84 This report recommended legisla-
                                                        
74  Bauman, supra note 69, at 340. See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798–99 
(1969); Gardner, 389 F.2d at 830, cert. denied, Cohen, 393 U.S. at 825 (1968). 
75  INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 213 (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13150/chapter/1 
[https://perma.cc/H8ZP-7F68]. 
76  Mindy H. Chapman, Rx: Just What the Doctor Ordered: International Standards for Med-
ical Devices, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 566, 573 (1994). 
77  Id. at 573–74. 
78  Id. at 574. 
79  Tamsen Valoir & Shubha Ghosh, FDA Preemption of Drug and Device Labeling: Who 
Should Decide What Goes on a Drug Label?, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 555, 567 (2011). 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 568. 
84  This report was completed in 1970 by the blue-ribbon Cooper Committee (a study group 
on medical devices convened in 1969 by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). 
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tive reform of medical device regulation.85 Congress finally acted in 1976 by 
passing the Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) in which many of Dr. 
Cooper’s recommendations were implemented.86 
The MDA’s primary purpose was to ensure devices were safe and effec-
tive.87 Devices were now grouped by level of risk and intended use into three 
classes: Class I being the lowest risk and Class III being the highest risk.88 Cur-
rently, Class I devices account for 47 percent of medical devices, have a very 
simple design, and present minimal risk.89 Some examples of Class I devices 
would be tongue depressors or cold packs.90 Approximately 43 percent of med-
ical devices are considered Class II.91 These devices are more complicated and 
have more risk than Class I devices, but are not life-sustaining.92 Examples of 
Class II devices include contact lenses or powered wheelchairs.93 Finally, Class 
III devices account for approximately 10 percent of devices on the market; they 
sustain or support life and carry an unreasonably high risk of harm.94 Examples 
of Class III devices include breast implants or cardiac pacemakers.95 The level 
of regulation required for each product depends on its level of classification.96 
In addition to the general controls to which all devices must adhere,97 Class 
I and Class II devices are required to fulfill pre-market notification require-
ments.98 The pre-market notification requires the manufacturer to register its 
                                                                                                                                 
Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 6, 6 n.15 (1989). 
85  Id. 
86  Bauman, supra note 69, at 341. 
87  Id. 
88  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2012). 
89  Learn If a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.h 
tm [https://perma.cc/5CNK-E863] (last updated Dec. 29, 2017). 
90  Stephen D. Harris, Preemption of State Tort Claims Under the Medical Device Amend-
ments, 24 COLO. LAW. 2217, 2217 (1995). 
91  David Chang, Internalizing the External Costs of Medical Device Preemption, 65 
HASTINGS L.J. 283, 288 (2013). 
92  Robin Helmick Turner, Preemption of State Product Liability Claims Involving Medical 
Devices: Premarket Approval as a Shield Against Liability, 72 WASH. L. REV. 963, 966–67 
(1997). 
93  Alex Krouse, iPads, iPhones, Androids, and Smartphones: FDA Regulation of Mobile 
Phone Applications as Medical Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 747 (2012); Walsh & 
Pyrich, supra note 4, at 919. 
94  Chang, supra note 91, at 288–89. 
95  Issar, supra note 3, at 1089 n.24 (2015). 
96  Turner, supra note 92, at 966. 
97  Class I/II Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/G396-NQFU] (last updated June 26, 2014). 
98  James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending Substantial Equivalence: An Argument for the Continu-
ing Validity of the 510(k) Premarket Notification Process, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 906 
(2008). 
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intent to market a medical device with the FDA.99 The FDA offers a limited re-
view process for qualifying devices that are substantially equivalent to a pre-
existing device.100 This process is known as the 510(k) process, and the focus is 
on equivalence rather than safety.101 Statute 510(k) requires that the manufac-
turer establish that the device was either legally on the market before May 28, 
1976, or that the device is substantially equivalent to a device marketed before 
that date.102 Today, as discussed below, most Class I devices are exempt from 
this requirement because they pose little risk to the public.103 However, most 
Class II devices are not exempt from this requirement.104 If a Class II device 
does not meet the substantial equivalence test, it will have to go through the 
Class III pre-market approval process.105 Finally, Class III devices must under-
go the more rigorous pre-market approval process, which requires manufactur-
ers to produce significant amounts of data that prove the product is safe and ef-
fective through clinical trials.106 
Although the MDA created additional protections for the public, it still 
contained massive flaws. First, the “grandfather clause” allowed dangerous de-
vices to remain on the market so long as they had been on the market prior to 
May 28, 1976.107 Even worse, manufacturers were not required to test designs 
and materials prior to manufacturing.108 This left medical devices with fatal 
flaws on the market at a time when the public “[i]ronically . . . finally felt more 
confident that medical devices were safe for use when the FDA approved 
them.”109 Additionally, this new regulatory scheme did not account for the in-
creased burden on the FDA and did not provide additional resources to meet 
that burden.110 This resulted in regulations being enacted with an agency that 
lacked the resources to enforce them. 
                                                        
99  Turner, supra note 92, at 967. 
100  Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 991 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (S.D. W. Va. 2014). 
101  Id. at 752. 
102  Daniel W. Whitney, Guide to Preemption of State-Law Claims Against Class III PMA 
Medical Devices, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 113, 115–16 (2010). 
103  Flaherty, Jr., supra note 98, at 906. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of Parallel 
Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1196, 1198–99 (2011). 
107  Chapman, supra note 76, at 575. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Amanda Swanson, 510(k) Clearance: Opportunities to Incentivize Medical Device Safety 
Through Comparative Effectiveness Research, 10 IND. HEALTH. L. REV. 117, 153–54 (2013). 
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E. Further Injuries Prompt the Enactment of the Safe Medical Devices Act of 
1990 
 Following the MDA of 1976, more reports of faulty devices dotted the 
headlines. In one case, sixty to eighty thousand patients received a faulty jaw 
implant designed to treat TMJ.111 The implant would disintegrate when the pa-
tient chewed, resulting in “nausea, infections, dizziness, hearing and sight 
loss.”112 The device was not reviewed before going to market because it was 
considered substantially equivalent to other jaw implants.113 The weaknesses in 
the MDA were first addressed by the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 
(“SMDA”).114 The SMDA was necessary because implementing the MDA reg-
ulations was proving too difficult for the FDA.115 The statutory language of the 
MDA was overly complex, the language was interpreted with conflicting re-
sults, and the FDA lacked the necessary resources to properly implement the 
regulations.116 
In response to these flaws, the SMDA sought to prevent additional injuries 
from substantially equivalent devices by expanding the reporting requirements 
for devices.117 Originally, only manufacturers had a duty to report the adverse 
effects of a device.118 But the SMDA required hospitals and health care facili-
ties to report any problems with a device.119 Additionally, this amendment at-
tempted to clarify the definition of “substantial equivalence” for new devices, 
and expanded recall authority of the FDA.120 
 But the SMDA created a scenario which overwhelmed the FDA. The FDA 
could not adequately process and document the massive flood of information 
                                                        
111  Chapman, supra note 76, at 575. 
112  Id. at 575–76. 
113  Id. at 575. 
114  Bauman, supra note 69, at 346. 
115  H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6306. The 
full section reads: 
Since the comprehensive medical device law was enacted in 1976, difficulties have persisted in 
the implementation of the law. These implementation problems appear to be the result of: (1) 
complexities in the law; (2) the manner in which FDA interpreted certain provisions of the 1976 
law; and (3) limited resources. The purpose of this legislation is to modify the underlying law in 
ways that will result in greater protection of the public health. 
Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Michael VanBuren, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: The 
Need for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 441, 458 
(2007). 
118  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 519, 90 Stat. 539, 564–65 
(1976). 
119  Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(1)(A) (2012); Chapman, supra 
note 76, at 576. 
120  Bauman, supra note 69, at 348–49; Chapman, supra note 76, at 576. 
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and data from adverse events.121 The lack of FDA resources was one explana-
tion for the shortcomings of the SMDA.122 Manufacturers complained that the 
regulatory process was hindering products from getting to market due to the 
“burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming” process.123 A House Committee 
report summarized the problem with a familiar mantra: “[T]he current regulato-
ry system is not keeping pace with medical innovation.”124 The introduction of 
the SMDA was a positive step for the FDA, but without the resources to im-
plement and monitor the new regulations, the FDA continued to fall behind 
while technology continued moving forward. 
F. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997—A Move for 
Faster Access to Drugs and Devices 
In 1997, the legislature responded to the call for better patient access to 
medical devices and drugs with the FDAMA.125 In part, the FDAMA used a 
risk-based approach to the regulation of medical devices and introduced several 
new concepts in hopes of making the approval process more efficient.126 One of 
these new concepts, in an acknowledgement of the FDA’s lack of resources to 
timely review applications, was authorization of third-party reviewers for Class 
I and some Class II products.127 The use of the third-party reviewer would help 
                                                        
121  U.S. GOV’T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/HEHS-97-21, MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S SYSTEM FOR MONITORING PROBLEMS WITH APPROVED 
DEVICES 11 (1997). In a report from the United States General Accounting Office that ana-
lyzed FDA reporting data (from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, referred to 
in the report as CDRH) between 1987 and 1995, the GAO found: 
Between March 1994 and April 1995, a backlog of about 48,900 malfunction reports from man-
ufacturers accumulated at CDRH. Many of the malfunction reports were not entered into the ad-
verse event reporting system and available for complete review and assessment until 1996. Al-
though FDA assigns malfunction reports a lower priority than reports of death and serious inju-
ry, processing malfunction reports quickly is critical because of their potential to alert FDA to 
device problems that could cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if the malfunction 
were to recur. Entering all adverse event reports into the system promptly allows FDA analysts 
to perform more complete reviews and assessments on device problems. Further, entering event 
reports expeditiously is important because an event report, regardless of whether it requires im-
mediate action, can become part of a group of reports that ultimately stimulates corrective action 
on a device problem. 
Id. 
122  Id. at 21. “CDRH attributed its lack of documentation to the large volume of adverse 
event reports and limited staff resources.” 
123  H.R. REP. NO. 105-307, at 13 (1997). 
124  Id. 
125  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). “A House Committee 
report states that ‘in a number of cases, for both 510(k)-cleared and PMA products, increased 
requirements that are burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming have delayed patients’ 
access to new devices.’ ” Bauman, supra note 69, at 350. 
126  Flaherty, Jr., supra note 98, at 910. 
127  Bauman, supra note 69, at 350–51. 
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to alleviate the burden on the FDA by allowing other accredited persons to help 
with reviewing 510(k) applications.128 
Another notable concept that was introduced with respect to pre-market 
clearance, was a series of changes to requirements for non-Class III devices. 
Most Class I devices and some Class II devices were exempted from the 510(k) 
notification requirements.129 “As a result, FDAMA now allowed [most Class I 
and] some Class II devices to enter the market without any preclearance, some 
to enter the market after notification but without any special controls, and some 
to enter the market after notification and subject to special controls.”130 
The FDAMA also restricted the FDA’s power to reject 510(k) applications 
based on substantial equivalence, so the FDA could only reject based on the in-
tended use of the device.131 Up until that point, “industry advocates believed 
FDA was denying many 510(k) submissions because of risks associated with 
off-label use. FDAMA specifically prohibited FDA from denying 510(k) sub-
mission for any uses other than the proposed intended use of the device.”132 
Additionally, reporting requirements were amended to require only post-market 
surveillance of higher risk devices, and allowed a representative sample of hos-
pitals and health care facilities to report complications as opposed to all hospi-
tals and facilities.133 These changes helped alleviate some of the pressure on the 
FDA, because it met the public’s desire for faster access to drugs and devices, 
but the FDA was now allowing greater access to drugs and devices at the price 
of less direct oversight.134 Despite decades of amendments, medical device reg-
ulation continued to fall short of achieving the FDA’s mandate of protecting a 
vulnerable while fostering innovation. 
II. THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT DELIVERS FASTER ACCESS WITH LESS 
OVERSIGHT ON MEDICAL DEVICES 
 The 21CCA, signed on Dec. 13, 2016, echoed the purpose of the FDAMA: 
to expedite the public’s access to new medical products and reduce the time 
and expense for manufacturers to obtain FDA approval.135 The 21CCA intro-
duced several new concepts, while restating some prior initiatives. The spirit of 
                                                        
128  Nick Littlefield & Nicole R. Hadas, A Survey of Developments in Food and Drug Law 
from July 1998 to November 1999, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 41 (2000). 
129  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(l)(1), (m)(1) (2012). 
130  Bauman, supra note 69, at 350. 
131  Id. at 351. 
132  Id. 
133  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
134  Cf. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 601–
03 (2005); see also FDA Backgrounder on FDAMA: The FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 1997), https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Laws 
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135  See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
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the Act was focused heavily on patient access to drugs and devices and consti-
tuted a new chapter in Congress’s attempt to create a system that maximizes 
public safety and innovation. The Act was robust and varied in its changes, but 
three changes in particular were germane to medical device regulation. 
A. Breakthrough Medical Device 
 One goal introduced in the act was getting “ ‘breakthrough’ ” medical de-
vices to market as quickly as possible.136 “FDA must offer a fast track toward 
approval for those . . . that can be considered to be a ‘breakthrough,’ which is a 
new legal status entitling their sponsors to ask . . . for a rapid evaluation and 
refinement of the device product’s application.”137 While the particular lan-
guage of this section is plagued with ambiguity and actually places a greater 
burden on the FDA, its importance lies in the desire to broaden public access to 
medical devices.138 In particular, one attribute of a “breakthrough device,” as 
defined by the Act, is one that “offer[s] significant advantages over existing 
approved or cleared alternatives, including the potential, compared to existing 
approved alternatives, to . . . facilitate patients’ ability to manage their own care 
. . . .”139 This vague language creates broad FDA discretion to decide which de-
vices can bypass the expensive and time-consuming requirements to gain full 
premarket approval. 
B. Expanded Class II Exemptions from Premarket Notification 
 Another section of the Act calls for the FDA to exempt certain non-Class 
III medical devices from 510(k) pre-market notification.140 This concept is not 
new to the 21CCA—the FDAMA introduced it in 1997, and the FDA respond-
ed by exempting sixty-two Class II devices from pre-market notification re-
quirements.141 The 21CCA amended Section 510(m) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360(m)) by instituting a requirement that the 
FDA publish a new list of exempted Class II devices within ninety days of the 
                                                        
136  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4 at § 18:63. 
 137  Id. 
138  [I]t is debatable whether any particular serious illness or condition should be consid-
ered ‘life threatening’ or ‘irreversibly debilitating’ as a prospective, general matter 
across thousands of patients, since the common thread is how all users will need this de-
vice. The word ‘breakthrough’ is like beauty, in the eyes of the beholder, and is a com-
parative adjective concerning the effects this device can produce compared to others in 
breaking through a scientific or technical barrier to a cure. 
Id. 
139  21st Century Cures Act sec. 3051, § 515C(b)(2)(C), 130 Stat. at 1121–22. 
140  FDA Proposes Devices to Be Exempted from 510 (k) Mandates Under Cures Act, 25 
GUIDE TO MED. DEVICE REG. NEWSL. 1 (Thompson Info. Servs., 2017). 
141  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & CTR. DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, PROCEDURES FOR 
CLASS II DEVICE EXEMPTIONS FROM PREMARKET NOTIFICATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 
AND CDRH STAFF 1 (1998), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegu 
lationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm080199.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6ZX-8RJR]. 
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21CCA, and every five years thereafter.142 Once again, this was a movement 
away from strict regulation on non-Class III devices; this section of the 21CCA 
reinforces that notion. 
C. Humanitarian Device Exemption 
 The third feature of the 21CCA relevant to this discussion concerns the 
Humanitarian Device Exemption. The amended language of that section reads: 
(1) To the extent consistent with the protection of the public health and safety 
and with ethical standards, it is the purpose of this subsection to encourage the 
discovery and use of devices intended to benefit patients in the treatment and di-
agnosis of diseases or conditions that affect not more than 8,000 individuals in 
the United States. 
(2) The Secretary may grant a request for an exemption from the effectiveness 
requirements of sections 360d and 360e of this title for a device for which the 
Secretary finds that-- 
(A) the device is designed to treat or diagnose a disease or condition that affects 
not more than 8,000 individuals in the United States, 
(B) the device would not be available to a person with a disease or condition re-
ferred to in subparagraph (A) unless the Secretary grants such an exemption and 
there is no comparable device, other than under this exemption, available to treat 
or diagnose such disease or condition, and 
(C) the device will not expose patients to an unreasonable or significant risk of 
illness or injury and the probable benefit to health from the use of the device 
outweighs the risk of injury or illness from its use, taking into account the prob-
able risks and benefits of currently available devices or alternative forms of 
treatment.143 
 The humanitarian device exemption is not new to the 21CCA; the new Act 
simply raises the maximum number of patients that would be helped by the 
new technology from four thousand to eight thousand.144 Again, this is another 
move to grant faster access to medical devices by lessening the FDA oversight 
of devices that fall within this category. The humanitarian device exemption set 
a precedent that, for certain devices, proving safety instead of efficacy will be 
sufficient to gain FDA approval.145 
Other significant changes to device regulation include: permitting central-
ized institutional review boards, or IRBs, for clinical trials of prospective de-
                                                        
142  21st Century Cures Act § 3054(b)(1)(A), 130 Stat. at 1126. 
143  21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (2012). 
144  21st Century Cures Act § 3052, 130 Stat. at 1124–25. In 1990, the SMDA added the hu-
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vices; requiring the FDA to consider the least burdensome means of demon-
strating safety and effectiveness at the premarket approval stage; and creating 
five new categories of medical software that do not count as medical devices.146 
With respect to medical devices, the 21CCA’s purpose is clear: “The pur-
pose of this section is to encourage the Secretary, and provide the Secretary 
with sufficient authority, to apply efficient and flexible approaches to expedite 
the development of, and prioritize the [FDA]’s review of, devices that represent 
breakthrough technologies.”147 The very moniker of a “breakthrough technolo-
gy” carries with it both the optimism of the technology age but also the vapid 
promises of the snake-oil salesmen of a century ago. 
Nevertheless, the legislature has made clear its intent that getting products 
to the public is of paramount importance: “Speed in product approval, and ac-
ceptance of wider and later sources of data about the new device, is the new 
‘ideal’ which Congress wrote into the Act.”148 However, the key difference in 
the 21CCA is that, in the prior program, review of fast-tracked products was 
dependent upon the FDA’s ability to provide staff and resources.149 In the 
21CCA, the FDA may no longer deny review for lack of resources, which theo-
retically removes a barrier for products to reach review.150 However, the FDA 
has been plagued with a lack of resources for decades. When the SMDA was 
written, Congress explicitly stated that the FDA’s lack of resources was a prob-
lem.151 The SMDA acknowledged this failure and attributed “limited resources” 
as part of the reason for the lack of implementation of the 1976 Act.152 One is 
left to wonder whether a future act will echo the SMDA, lamenting the FDA’s 
failure to implement the 21CCA due to limited resources. 
 Additionally, the 21CCA appears, on its face, to be a pro-research piece of 
legislation, but the funding promised ($4,796,000,000) is a non-guaranteed 
lump sum that will require additional legislation for it to be released.153 Alt-
                                                        
146  See 21st Century Cures Act § 3060, 130 Stat. at 1130–31; How the 21st Century Cures 
Act Impacts Medical Device Software, METHOD SENSE (Dec. 21, 2016), 
http://methodsense.com/21st-century-cures-act-impacts-medical-device-software/ [https://per 
ma.cc/NUR8-TNFU]; IDE Institutional Review Boards (IRB), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDe
vice/InvestigationalDeviceExemptionIDE/ucm046745.htm [https://perma.cc/S3DT-RXHA] 
(last updated Dec. 22, 2017). But see H.R. REP. NO. 105-307, at 6, 13 (1997). 
147  21st Century Cures Act sec. 3051, § 515C(a), 130 Stat. at 1121. 
148  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 4. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6306. 
152  Id. 
153  21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001, 130 Stat. 1033, 1039–40 (2016); 
The 21st Century Cures Act of 2016, PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/our-
work/health-and-safety/21st-century-cures-act-2016 [https://perma.cc/BJ7F-Q4T9] (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2018). 
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hough the bill was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support,154 many 
members of Congress, including Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth War-
ren, have criticized this legislation because it gave too many concessions to the 
pharmaceutical companies.155 Referred to by some as “an early Christmas pre-
sent” to “Big Pharma,” the 21CCA promised faster and less expensive approval 
processes for certain medical devices.156 
Although faster access to medical products is a sound goal, the Act suffers 
from being one-sided—benefiting the corporations manufacturing these devices 
rather than the public consuming them. Lessening regulations to encourage in-
novations is a noble goal, but without another mechanism in place to protect the 
public, the FDA is promoting innovation instead of patient safety. The solution 
to this problem will require a balanced approach that takes into account the 
need for faster access to innovative medical devices, the need to protect the 
public from unsafe devices, and the limited resources of the FDA to accomplish 
their charge. 
III.  REGULATION, PREEMPTION AND TORT LAW—A BALANCED APPROACH TO 
SAFETY AND INNOVATION 
As discussed above, the FDA historically has taken a defensive approach to 
regulation, acting only after tragedy strikes. It has also fought the battle of 
oversight by “chasing” manufacturers who do everything they can to avoid 
regulation.157 Rather than create a system that spawns endless litigation be-
tween the FDA and manufacturers trying to avoid regulation, the system should 
motivate manufacturers to seek out FDA approval. 
The FDA is currently failing to regulate devices that could cause extreme 
bodily harm and death while regulating other devices that pose little to no harm 
to a person.158 One example of this is the cryotherapy chamber discussed at the 
beginning of this article. This popular device, used by celebrities, professional 
athletes, and the public, which subjects the human body to temperatures colder 
than any recorded temperature on earth, is not regulated by the FDA.159 Hun-
dreds of spas, salons, and quasi-medical facilities across our country are offer-
                                                        
154  The Senate vote was 94 to 5, and the House vote was 392 to 26. Mike DeBonis, Con-
gress Passes 21st Century Cures Act, Boosting Research and Easing Drug Approvals, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/ 
07/congress-passes-21st-century-cures-act-boosting-research-and-easing-drug-approvals/ 
[https://perma.cc/CXV4-GUKA]. 
155  Id. 
156  Michael Carome, Pharma, Medical Device Industries Got an Early Christmas Present, 
But Not Everything on Their List, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.citizen.org/ 
media/press-releases/pharma-medical-device-industries-got-early-christmas-present-not-
everything [https://perma.cc/62J8-N7PM]. 
157  See supra Part II. 
158  Swanson, supra note 110, at 122; CBS NEWS, supra note 1; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN, supra note 89. 
159  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 2. 
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ing this service and claiming benefits ranging from weight loss to reducing in-
flammation.160 However, if the device is not used properly, it can result in 
frostbite, loss of limbs, or even death.161 The manufacturers of this device skirt-
ed regulations, even though the device fell squarely within the FDA’s definition 
of a “medical device.”162 On the other hand, the FDA is spending time and re-
sources regulating devices as benign as exam gloves.163 FDA resources could—
and should—be allocated more efficiently. 
A system that incentivizes manufacturers of dangerous products to seek out 
FDA approval, while allowing manufacturers of simple and harmless devices to 
avoid going through the approval process would be beneficial. This type of sys-
tem would offer greater protection for the public, reduce administrative costs 
for the FDA, and presumably grant faster access to many medical devices. The 
FDAMA and the 21CCA did initiate a degree of risk-based regulation, but the 
legislation did not go far enough to achieve the goal of encouraging innovation 
while still protecting the public. 
A.  Federal Preemption as a “Carrot” to Encourage Manufacturers to Seek 
Voluntary FDA Approval for Safety 
One way to encourage manufacturers of potentially dangerous Class II 
products to seek FDA approval is to offer a manufacturer federal preemption 
against state law tort claims for devices that have gone through—and have been 
granted—pre-market approval. This may seem counterintuitive as a means of 
protecting the public, but, as discussed below, when preemption is balanced 
with increased tort law damages for manufacturers that do not get approval, the 
public will have a strong tool against the manufacturer. 
                                                        
160  Whole Body Cryotherapy Provides Benefits in Three Primary Settings, WHOLE BODY 
CRYOTHERAPY, http://www.wholebodycryotherapy.org/benefits [https://perma.cc/3SYG-
KN5E] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 2. 
161  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 2; CBS NEWS, supra note 1. 
162  Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, im-
plant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or acces-
sory, which is—(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharma-
copeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other ani-
mals, or (3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, 
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on 
the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the 
achievement of its primary intended purposes. 
Id. 
163  February 2017 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandC
learances/510kClearances/ucm544999.htm [https://perma.cc/RX5E-338Z] (last updated Dec. 
7, 2017). 
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Currently, when a Class III device has been given pre-market approval, 
that product has federal preemption from state law tort claims.164 In Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,165 the United States Supreme Court held that the MDA’s 
preemption clause barred common-law claims challenging the safety or effec-
tiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that received pre-market ap-
proval from the FDA.166 
The MDA prohibits states from imposing requirements “different from, or 
in addition to, any requirement applicable . . . to the device.”167 The Supreme 
Court has held that a state’s common-law duties, including that of common-law 
liability in tort, constitute “requirements” as contemplated by the MDA.168 
Where a device has undergone the pre-market approval process by the FDA, 
the device is preempted from state law tort claims.169 This means that private 
litigants may not sue for damages against a device manufacturer if the device 
has undergone FDA premarket approval.170 
However, federal preemption of state law tort claims only applies to Class 
III devices that have received pre-market approval by the FDA.171 As men-
tioned earlier, Class I and II devices account for nearly 90 percent of all medi-
cal devices.172 Class I devices are almost all exempt from pre-market notifica-
tion because they are simple and relatively safe.173 Class II devices, unless 
exempt, must still go through a pre-market notification process.174 This process 
would require the filing of a 510(k) to prove substantial equivalence to another 
product that is already legally on the market, or, if not substantially equivalent 
to another device, the Class II device would have to go through pre-market ap-
                                                        
164  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24, 330 (2008); see also Whitney, supra 
note 102, at 118–19. 
165  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312. 
166  Id. at 320–21, 330. 
167  Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2012); Riegel, 552 U.S. 
at 321 (quoting § 360k(a)(1)). 
168  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504–05 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Id. at 509 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
Before a new Class III device may be introduced to the market, the manufacturer must provide 
the FDA with a “reasonable assurance” that the device is both safe and effective. . . . Despite its 
relatively innocuous phrasing, the process of establishing this “reasonable assurance,” which is 
known as the “premarket approval,” or “PMA” process, is a rigorous one. Manufacturers must 
submit detailed information regarding the safety and efficacy of their devices, which the FDA 
then reviews, spending an average of 1,200 hours on each submission. 
Id. at 477. 
169  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317, 322. 
170  Id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
171  Whitney, supra note 102, at 118–19. 
172  See supra text accompanying notes 89, 91. 
173  Medical Devices Exemptions 510(k) and GMP Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm [https://perma.cc 
/J7AK-KBJR] (last updated Feb. 26, 2018). 
174  Flaherty, Jr., supra note 98, at 906. 
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proval.175 Although the 21CCA calls for an updated list of Class II exempt de-
vices, this list, and the updates required every five years,176 will likely continue 
to result in wasted FDA resources due to processing pre-market notification 
applications of products that do not pose a significant risk to the public. 
One part of this Article’s proposed solution is to eliminate the mandatory 
pre-market notification requirements for all Class I and II devices. Essentially, I 
am proposing all Class I and II devices should be exempt from the pre-market 
notification process.177 This will unlock countless hours of FDA resources cur-
rently being spent on processing thousands of applications for devices that are 
relatively safe.178 Although the hours spent on an individual 510(k) application 
are minimal compared to the hours spent for pre-market approval, the sheer 
volume of 510(k) applications received each year require a significant amount 
of FDA resources to process.179 The second part of this solution would be that 
manufacturers of Class II devices that voluntarily seek out and receive FDA 
approval would also be granted federal preemption from state tort law claims. 
This updated regulatory scheme would allow Class II devices that seek approv-
                                                        
175  Id. at 910–12. Alternatively, the manufacturer could seek classification as a Class I or 
Class II through the de novo pathway—where there is no substantial equivalence but the 
FDA determines it poses little to moderate safety risk. If the FDA approves the de novo ap-
plication, the device would be categorized as a Class I or Class II and marketed immediately. 
The device may also serve as a future predicate device. The FDA would k U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III 
DESIGNATION): GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 5 
(2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceD
ocuments/UCM273903.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7ZD-CYQR]. 
176  21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3054(b)(1)(A), 130 Stat. 1033, 1126 
(2016). 
177  The additional general controls required such as registration and listing, labeling, GMPs, 
are outside the scope of this article. Roger W. Bivans, Substantially Equivalent? Federal 
Preemption of State Common-Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 
1090–91 (1996); Class I/II Exemptions, supra note 97. 
178  Bivans, supra note 177, at 1121; Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors 
and Their Role in Balancing the Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 432 (2011). “[T]he FDA ‘lacks the resources needed to accomplish 
its large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself for an increasingly challeng-
ing future.’ ” Eggen, supra note 3, at 204; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE 
OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (Alina 
Baciu et al., eds., 2007). 
179  For example, in 2016 there were 2,931 devices cleared for approval through the 510(k) 
process, but only thirty-nine devices with original applications approved through the pre-
market approval process. Devices Cleared in 2016: 2016 Medical Device 510(k) Clearances, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20171114011521/https://ww 
w.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/
510kClearances/ucm483517.htm [https://perma.cc/7YZC-23W3] (last updated Jan. 4, 2017); 
Devices Approved in 2016: 2016 Monthly PMA Listings, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20171114011458/https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
ProductsandMedicalProcdures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/PMAApprovals/ucm4843 
83.htm [https://perma.cc/VNH8-WJEJ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2017). 
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al to show only that the device is safe for public use. It would not require the 
manufacturer to show that the product was effective.180 This is similar to the 
Humanitarian Device Exemptions implemented in 1990 and 2016, which re-
quired proof of safety only,181 I propose this approach should be adopted for all 
Class II devices voluntarily seeking FDA approval. This would allow the FDA 
to continue its goal of protecting the public from harmful products, while al-
lowing faster access to medical devices. 
Preemption, therefore, would allow manufacturers to better quantify their 
potential costs while reducing or eliminating exposure to tort liability.182 The 
value of preemption should not be underestimated.183 Devices that do not quali-
fy for federal preemption would remain exposed to state tort liability. 
 
                                                        
180  To further ease the burden of the approval process for non-Class III devices, manufactur-
ers should only be required to show the safety of their device, not efficacy. This principle has 
two goals in mind. First, it would focus the process on the main concern of protecting the 
public’s safety, ensuring the proper controls are in place for the safe use of the device. The 
approval process would be the FDA’s stamp of approval on the safety of a device, but it 
would be the public’s role to investigate the efficacy of a product. Acts like the FDAMA and 
21CCA have made clear the intent of Congress to provide earlier access to medical products 
and involving the public in their own medical care. Placing the duty of vetting efficacy in the 
hands of the public is far more equitable than it was a century ago. Today a consumer is able 
to use the internet to research the efficacy of a particular product, and the rise of areas like 
psychosomatic medicine further erode the idea that establishing efficacy is a necessity. See 
Psychosomatic Medicine Fellowship: Consultation Liaison Psychiatry, YALE SCH. OF MED. 
http://medicine.yale.edu/psychiatry/psychosomatic/training/fellowship/ [https://perma.cc/W8 
6M-48PK] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). Moreover, beginning in 1962 when the FDA’s over-
sight of medical products became “paternalistic,” and gaining momentum during the AIDS 
crisis of the 1980s, patients’ rights activists have clamored for a larger role of the public in 
deciding the efficacy of medical products. See Harold Edgar & David J. Rothman, New 
Rules for New Drugs: The Challenge of AIDS to the Regulatory Process, 68 MILBANK Q. 
SUPP. 1 111, 111–12, 121 (1990). 
181  21st Century Cures Act, § 3052 at 1124–25; Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-629, § 14, 104 Stat. 4511, 4524. 
182  See David Brennan, Federal Preemption of All State Law Tort Claims in Riegel v. Med-
tronic: A Need to Undo a Serious Wrong, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 138 (2009). 
183  See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 4, at 953. 
A significant disincentive to create new drugs and medical devices would still exist in the form 
of product liability lawsuits. Even where a drug or device has been approved by the FDA, prod-
uct liability suits delve into the adequacy of a manufacturer’s research, development and testing 
processes. If a manufacturer is held liable for producing a defective drug or medical device, it 
can be forced to pay damages awards far in excess of the cost of researching and developing the 
product, even including the high costs of the FDA approval process. The relative costs of under-
going FDA review for approval or complying with FDA regulations are small when compared to 
the potential costs of mass tort lawsuits and punitive damages. Any attempt to solve the problem 
of the costliness of compliance with FDA regulations will not be completely successful unless it 
addresses the costliness of product liability lawsuits as well. 
Id. at 953–54. 
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B. Tort Law as a “Stick” to Encourage Manufacturers to Produce Safe 
Products 
In order to balance the risk of potentially ineffective and dangerous Class II 
devices entering the market, the final part to this Article’s proposal is a signifi-
cant increase in damages awards for plaintiffs injured by medical devices that 
do not have FDA approval. For example, a damages multiplier and punitive 
damages could be available remedies against a manufacturer who marketed a 
medical device without seeking FDA approval, and the device injured a plain-
tiff.184 
Regulation and tort law have been described as a “dual track” of safety in-
centives.185 Regulatory schemes work prophylactically while tort law acts in 
response to a manufacturer’s failure to discharge its duty of care.186 But tort lia-
bility is a factor in a manufacturer’s decision-making process, particularly with 
respect to expending safety costs.187 
Product liability has been called the most effective means of motivating 
manufacturers to design safe products.188 “In industries with potentially high-
hazard products, but not subject to significant product-related regulation (e.g., 
industrial machinery), product liability probably dominates design decisions, in 
terms of safety considerations.”189 Even where products are highly regulated—
like drugs—product liability remains at the forefront of design considera-
tions.190 Currently, high-hazard medical devices exist that the FDA has failed to 
regulate.191 These high-hazard products are practically unregulated, and tort law 
remains the most effective way to protect the safety of a vulnerable populace. 
 One criticism in the use of tort law to shape manufacturer behaviors that 
tort law unreasonably dissuades manufacturers from innovation or production 
                                                        
184  FDAMA authorizes the FDA to impose civil penalties for various acts or omissions that 
undermine its purpose; alternatively or concurrently, it could be expanded to include civil 
penalties for non-approved, non-Class III devices that cause serious harm. Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 335b (2012). Whether a product that has not under-
gone the FDA approval process qualifies as a medical device, in this solution, would be an 
issue of fact and a matter for litigation. As suggested herein, expanding the public’s role in 
helping regulate devices is one that empowers the public and relieves the burden upon the 
FDA. Any product that applies for FDA approval but is denied by the FDA because it does 
not qualify as a medical device would not face increased tort liability. This would further 
incentivize manufacturers to unilaterally come to the FDA, rather than attempt to hide from 
it. 
185  Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Para-
dox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 637 (2007). 
186  Id. at 637. 
187  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
188  GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION viii (1983). 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  See CBS NEWS, supra note 1. 
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of devices that would benefit the public.192 Under this theory, the cost of litiga-
tion would negate the manufacturer’s expected profits and the product would 
never be created.193 The counter-argument is that, in the past, manufacturers 
have factored litigation into a cost/benefit analysis and determined it cheaper to 
pay injury claims than make a product safe or perform a recall.194 Once again, 
both sides can cite specific examples of how tort law factors into device safety, 
either as too burdensome or too impotent.195 The important point is that either 
way, it is clear that tort litigation matters to manufacturers because they factor 
potential litigation and injury costs into their decision-making processes. 
 Tort law is a necessary element in a regulatory system tasked with keeping 
pace with technology, an adversary it cannot possibly match. 
[W]hile tort law does not provide a perfect regulatory system, it is a necessary 
supplement to the equally imperfect oversight by the FDA. As it currently 
stands, the FDA cannot adequately identify the risks associated with devices be-
fore they are on the market, nor can it effectively monitor and regulate those 
products once they are in widespread use.196 
Tort law provides a compensatory scheme for those who are injured by de-
fective devices, but, if used correctly in conjunction with the regulatory stat-
utes, it could also serve a preventive purpose, incentivizing manufacturers to 
produce safe products and seek voluntary certification of safety from the 
FDA.197 
CONCLUSION 
 The FDA’s history shows a cycle of tragedy followed by legislative re-
sponse. Unfortunately, because technology is increasing at a rate much faster 
than Congress can anticipate, the legislation is always playing “catch up” to ad-
equately regulate new products and keep the public safe. Additionally, an un-
der-funded and over-tasked FDA lacks the resources necessary to ensure the 
safety of medical devices on the market. 
Described herein, the requirements imposed upon the FDA from its earliest 
days have always been more than it could bear. From the days when it was re-
quired to prove the lack of safety for a device—rather than the manufacturer 
                                                        
192  Issar, supra note 3, at 1113. 
193  Id. 
194  See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Brian 
Leon, Four-Wheeled Flubs: The 8 Biggest Automotive Scandals of All Time, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2015, 10:45 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/autos/7-biggest-
automotive-scandals-time-article-1.2371949 [https://perma.cc/78A4-PJFS]; Medical Device 
Maker Pleads Guilty to a Cover-Up, Agrees to Pay $92.4 Million, CEDAR VALLEY BUS. 
MONTHLY (June 13, 2003), http://wcfcourier.com/business/local/medical-device-maker-
pleads-guilty-to-a-cover-up-agrees/article_dafaac12-f4e2-5129-a785-37d788876f3e.html 
[https://perma.cc/J4G4-KM2B]. 
195  See Issar, supra note 3, at 1113. 
196  Id. at 1113–14. 
197  Id. at 1114. 
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prove its safety and efficacy—to processing thousands of adverse reports, 
through the current landscape of minimizing the time it takes to get a product 
approved, the legislature has largely ignored the limitations of the FDA. Even 
the 21CCA, which seeks to address these limitations by reducing and eliminat-
ing requirements for certain non-Class III medical devices, has increased the 
expectations of the FDA’s performance by eliminating “lack of resources” as a 
reason to delay review and approval of devices.198 
The more effective solution is to eliminate mandatory regulation of non-
Class III devices altogether. Instead, as explained above, the FDA could re-
move mandatory premarket notification of Class I and II devices, and offer a 
voluntary premarket approval process. In the 21CCA, Congress has already in-
dicated a shift towards reducing the impact upon both the FDA and non-Class 
III manufacturers.199 Therefore, eliminating mandatory premarket notification 
by the FDA would move the needle even further. The bulk of the FDA’s effort 
in the medical device arena could then be focused on Class III medical devices, 
which would maintain regulation of devices carrying the greatest risk and elim-
inate the burden on manufacturers of all other medical devices. 
The key to a comprehensive solution is to balance the reduced FDA over-
sight of non-Class III devices with the deterrent of increased state tort law 
damages. This system would promote one of two tracks for manufacturers. 
First, if a manufacturer identifies the possibility of its device seriously injuring 
an individual, the damages multiplier would incentivize the manufacturer to 
seek voluntary FDA approval to obtain preemption, or, at the very least, make a 
safer product. Gray area devices, like a cryotherapy chamber, would be a typi-
cal example of this type of analysis because the device’s potential adverse ef-
fects carry the potential for considerable damages. The second possibility is 
that a manufacturer determines that, even in an adverse event, the damages to 
any consumer would be minimal and it would therefore forego the approval 
process as an unnecessary burden. An example of this might be the maker of a 
                                                        
198  O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 136. Additionally, there is precedent for Class II 
devices receiving state tort preemption based on FDA promulgated guidelines. Bexis, Suc-
cessful Class II Medical Device Preemption Decision, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Sept. 28, 2011), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2011/09/successful-class-ii-medical-device.html 
[https://perma.cc/J482-LQEB]. The preemption landscape is still unclear and an express pro-
vision would also alleviate some litigation arising from the ambiguities. 
Additionally (although the issues [were] not addressed by the Lohr Court), Class II devices have 
been held to be preempted if device-specific regulations have been promulgated by the FDA. In 
Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s state claims were preempted 
because tampons, although a Class II rather than a Class III device, have been the subject of sev-
eral specific FDA regulations mandating warnings for toxic shock syndrome. 
Regulatory Preemption of Medical Devices, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/litiga 
tion-disputes/regulatory-preemption-of-medical-devices.html [https://perma.cc/E8GY-FZ 
XX] (last visited Feb. 27, 2018); see also Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 737 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
199  See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3054(b)(1)(A)(i), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1126 (2016). 
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magnetic bracelet touted to improve healing, where damages for an adverse 
event would likely be minimal, like treatment for a rash. 
These two principles act to place the premarket process in the hands of the 
manufacturer to determine the best course of action while incentivizing them to 
create a safe product without overburdening the FDA. Increasing tort liability 
impacts potentially dangerous products while benign ones may enjoy the re-
duced burden of getting products to market faster. Reducing the burden of ap-
proval to proving only safety further incentivizes manufacturers to obtain ap-
proval. This solution reduces oversight by the FDA while expanding the role of 
the public market for efficacy, and tort litigation for safety. Both the public’s 
and the manufacturer’s interests are taken into account. The answer, therefore, 
lies in contracting regulation while, at the same time, increasing oversight and 
legal remedies. 
